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Abstract
Workers can have good or bad work habits. These traits are transmitted
from one generation to the next through a learning and imitation process, which
depends on parents’ investment in the trait and the social environment where
children live. We show that if a sufficiently high proportion of employers have
taste-based prejudices against minority workers, their prejudices are always self-
fulfilled in steady state and minority workers end up having, on average, worse
work habits than majority workers. This leads to a ghetto culture. Affirmative
Action can improve the welfare of minorities whereas integration can be beneficial
to minority workers but detrimental to workers from the majority group.
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1 Introduction
According to a survey conducted in Chicago in 1988, one of the main reasons why
employers are not willing to hire inner-city black workers is their lack of basic skills
and work ethics. As expressed by a suburban employer in Chicago, “The experiences
that I’ve run into with it is that they develop bad habits, I guess is the best way to
put it. Not showing up to work on time. Not showing up to work. Somewhere down
the road they didn’t develop good work habits.”1
This is consistent with more general evidence from sociology and anthropology2
suggesting the existence of a persistent “ghetto culture”which is transmitted across
generations. Several scholars have put forward the importance of a low work-ethic
culture in inner-city neighborhoods. This culture is in sharp contrast with mainstream
American society’s working values rooted in the Protestant tradition. As argued by
Wilson (1996), it is the social, rather than the physical distance, that often separates
poor workers from good jobs. This is particularly true for the African American com-
munity, which has experienced high levels of segregation for at least a century (Massey
and Denton, 1993; Cutler et al., 1999).
“Inner-city social isolation also generates behavior not conducive to good
work histories. The patterns of behavior that are associated with a life of casual
work (tardiness and absenteeism) are quite different from those that accompany a
life of regular or steady work (e.g. the habit of waking up early in the morning to
a ringing alarm clock). ... in neighborhoods in which most families do not have
a steadily employed breadwinner, the norms and behavior patterns associated
with steady work compete with those associated with casual or infrequent work.”
(Wilson, 1996)
In the words of a counsellor to a training program aiming at exposing workers to
more conventional working values:
“To adopt a regular pattern you have to break with this environment. Your
friends laugh at you for going to work, that’s hell, they think you are trying to
be better than them! You have to have strong character to resist this pressure.
If all your friends and families went to work they would help you adopt a regular
schedule.” (cited in Bonney, 1975)3
Why do some groups perform worse in the labor market than others? Several
explanations have been put forward in the economics literature. In taste-based models
1See Wilson (1996) pages 119-120. The italics are ours.
2See, in particular, Hannerz (1969), Lewis, (1969), Wilson (1987), Lemman (1991) and Katz (1993).
3This is related to the idea of “acting white” where the economic success of blacks induces peers’
rejection (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Battu et al., 2007; Bisin et al., 2011).
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(Becker, 1957), prejudiced employers discriminate against some workers who will only
be hired at lower salaries. The statistical discrimination theory, on the other hand,
stresses the role of employers’ beliefs concerning the average quality of workers from
different groups. A member of the disadvantaged group will be discriminated against if
the employer believes her to be less qualified or reliable than a worker from other groups
(see, e.g. Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Lundberg and Startz, 1983); Coate and Loury,
1993; Moro and Norman, 2003; Verdier and Zenou, 2004). In these models, negative
stereotypes are self-fulfilling and discriminated workers end up being less productive.
More recently, it has been argued that the existence of neighborhood (or peer)
effects can explain the poor performance of some workers. In the absence of interaction
between different communities, due to the interaction with poorly performing peers,
some groups end up with lower levels of education and adverse labor market outcomes
(see, e.g. Arnott and Rowse, 1987; De Bartoleme, 1990; Benabou, 1993).4
Other aspects, like work habits (i.e., individual’s willingness to be unemployed,
collect welfare, avoid shirking, or work long hours) can also explain the different per-
formances of workers from different communities. These cultural traits, which affect
individual performance in the workplace, are, as documented by the sociological lit-
erature, strongly influenced by the family environment and the neighborhood where
children grow up.5 Employers are reluctant to hire some workers because the prevalent
values in their communities serves a proxy of their actual type. Policies promoting
integration may, on the contrary, have a positive effect via parents’ investments.
We model the formation of a “work-habit” trait using a mechanism that interacts
purposeful socialization decisions inside the family (direct vertical socialization) and in-
direct socialization processes via neighborhood effects and social interactions (oblique
and horizontal socialization). Indeed, based on some works on anthropology and so-
ciology (see in particular Boyd and Richerson, 1985 and Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman,
1981), there is a recent literature initiated by the seminal papers of Bisin and Verdier
(2000, 2001)6 arguing that the transmission of a particular trait (religion, ethnicity,
social status, etc.) is the outcome of a socialization inside and outside the family (like
e.g. peers and role models). These two types of socialization are cultural substitutes
(complements) if parents have less (more) incentives to socialize their children the more
widely dominant their values are in the population.7 In our model, we assume that
4For a general overview of the issue of race in the labor market, see Altonji and Blank (1999) and
Lundberg and Startz (2000).
5Mulligan (1996) shows that a child of parents who do not work and/or collect government benefits
for not working displays a tendency to behave similarly as an adult. Kohn (1969) concludes that
parents generalize their experiences on the job and pass them on to their children. More recently,
Osborne Groves (2005) suggests that intergenerational transmission of personality may be a channel
for explaining intergenerational persistence of income.
6Bisin and Verdier (2011) provide a very complete and recent overview of this literature. See also
Bisin et al. (2011) who model the child’s identity choice in a cultural transmission model.
7Bisin et al. (2004), Cohen Zada (2006), Patacchini and Zenou (2011a), Jellal and Wolff (2002),
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parents are forward looking and invest resources in order to prepare their children for
their future working experiences. Parents’ efforts and children’s preferences are affected
by the neighborhood where children live.
To be more precise, workers belong either to the majority group or the minority
group. All individuals are born equal but, depending on the parents’ investments and
the neighborhood, they acquire either a good (g) or a bad (b) work habit (absenteeism,
tardiness, low reliability...). When deciding how much effort to exert on shaping their
children’s attitudes towards work, parents must form expectations about the working
opportunities their children will face in the future.
We assume that each worker is randomly matched to an employer who has to assign
the worker to a job. Employers know the group to which a worker belongs but cannot
perfectly observe her type. A proportion of employers may be taste-based prejudiced
against minority workers and do not want to employ them. All other employers (im-
perfectly) screen the workers and employ those who seem to have good working habits.
This second group of employers are profit maximizers. The different treatments to
which the workers are subject create a discrepancy in expected value in the market of
the good trait for the two groups.
We first focus on a segregated society where minority and majority families live
in different neighborhoods. We show that if the fraction of prejudiced employers is
sufficiently high and the initial neighborhood quality of the minority sufficiently bad,
the employers’ beliefs are self-fulfilled. Indeed, in steady-state, all minority workers
end up with bad work habits and also non prejudiced employers prefer not to employ
workers from minority neighborhoods. Due to the adverse opportunities their children
are going to face, parents do not find it worthwhile to exert effort to transmit “good”
values. As a result, more workers from bad neighbourhoods have bad work habits.
This, in turn, influences members of the next generations in the same neighborhood
and the initial negative beliefs are confirmed in steady state.
We study the effect of different policies aiming at weakening this “ghetto” culture,
which perpetuates bad working habits. First, we analyze two different Affirmative
Action policies consisting of imposing (i) a quota for the discriminated group in good
jobs and (ii) a quota of workers from the discriminated group who are treated as
the workers of the other group. This second policy is just a general case of anti-
discrimination law where anti-discrimination requires equal treatment of everyone and
the Affirmative Action policy we consider here requires equal treatment of a fraction
of workers. We show that the first policy has always a negative long-run effect by
increasing the fraction of minority individuals with bad work habits while the second
one always increases the proportion of minority workers with good work habits.
Patacchini and Zenou (2011b), and Bisin et al. (2010) provide empirical studies of cultural transmis-
sion and socialization of, respectively, religious traits, altruism, preferences for education and ethnic
identity.
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Second, we study the effect of integration policies. In this case, children are, to some
extent, influenced by peers from both groups. We show that integration is beneficial
for the workers who come from the worst peer group and detrimental for the others, in
the short run. This result helps us understand why the latter may have an incentive
to resist integration and may be reluctant to accept social mixing.
Our theoretical model is related to the literature on cultural transmission and statis-
tical discrimination since it combines elements of both. However, there are important
differences that we would like to highlight.
We assume, unlike most of the literature on cultural transmission (see Bisin and
Verdier (2000) and Saez and Sjo¨gren (2008)), that (i) all parents, irrespective of their
type, agree that one of the traits (good habits) is superior8 and (ii) the cultural trans-
mission is biased. In particular, the probability of adopting a trait when learning from
society is a non-linear function of popularity, so that more popular traits are copied
with a probability higher than their population share. Moreover, children may have
their own views and favor one trait over the other. In order to allow for these bi-
ases we consider a general framework (see Saez-Marti (2011)) where the probability
of adopting a certain trait depends on its popularity (frequency dependency) as well
as on children’s own evaluation of the trait. With unbiased transmission and parents’
agreement on the ranking of traits, the only possible steady is one in which all agents
have the desirable trait. With the frequency-dependent bias both traits can co-exist in
equilibrium even if all parents invest on the same trait. The children bias affects the
actual equilibrium proportions.
Even though our model builds on the statistical discrimination literature (Phelps,
1972; Arrow, 1973; Lundberg and Startz, 1983; Coate and Loury, 1993; Moro and
Norman, 2003), there are important differences. First, the decisions are parental rather
than made by the worker. Second, the investment decision is the transmission of
work habit rather than a generic unspecified investment in productivity. Third, we
include taste-based discrimination as well as neighborhood effects. These differences
are important but not crucial. We have in fact two major contributions as compared
to the statistical discrimination literature. Let us explain them.
As stated above, we consider two types of Affirmative Action policies. The first one,
which imposes a quota for the discriminated group in good jobs, is very similar to that
of Coate and Loury (1993). Not surprisingly, we obtain similar results in the sense that
a patronizing equilibrium emerges in steady state where employers are obliged to lower
their standard in order to hire minority workers (those with bad work habits). However,
contrary to Coate and Loury (1993), we are able to give the exact conditions under
which such an equilibrium exists and is unique. In statistical-discrimination models
8Bisin and Verdier (2000) assume that parents prefer their own trait. This is a good assumption
for traits like religion since it seems a good approximation to assume that Catholic parents prefer their
children to be Catholic rather than belonging to another religion or another Christian denomination,
similarly Muslim parents prefer their children to be Muslim, etc.
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(such as that of Coate and Loury), it has never been proved that a patronizing interior
equilibrium exists. They only showed that one might be created. We also formally
show what happens to this intermediate equilibrium in terms of location and existence
when the Affirmative Action policy is implemented. This our first main contribution.
Our second main contribution is that, contrary to Coate and Loury, we consider
another Affirmative Action policy that imposes a quota for minority workers to be
treated like majority workers. As stated above, this is like an anti-discrimination law
where anti-discrimination requires equal treatment of everyone while the affirmative
action we consider here requires equal treatment of a fraction of workers. Interestingly,
we obtain exactly the opposite results than Coate and Loury and our first Affirmative
Action policy. In other words, we do not obtain a patronizing equilibrium where firms
are obliged to lower their standard in order to higher minority workers. On the contrary,
in Proposition 4 below, we show this Affirmative Action policy (anti-discrimiantion
law) always increases the proportion of good workers in equilibrium. The intuition is
that, following this policy, parents’ expectations become more favorable and thus they
increase their effort to transmit the good trait to their children. This, in turn, leads
to a higher proportion of individuals with good work habits in the minority group.
As a result, because of this policy, minority workers are more likely to have good
work habits and employers are more likely to maximize their profits and change their
negative beliefs about minority workers. This means that the first Affirmative Action
policy has to be implemented forever to help minority workers since employers keep
their negative beliefs while the second one can be efficient even if implemented once
since it changes the perception of employers about the work habits of minority workers.
As with the other policy, we are able to give the exact conditions under which such an
equilibrium exists and is unique.
To summarize, our main contribution is to propose a dynamic model combining
cultural transmission and discrimination. The model can explain why some (inner-
city) neighborhoods are populated by people with bad working habits (the “ghetto
culture”. In our framework, this is the result of a combination of discrimination, low
investment in work ethic from parents and bad peers. We are also able to study different
policy interventions and study how they affect the long-run outcomes.
Our findings are supported by the recent empirical literature investigating the effects
of culture on labor outcomes. Focusing on Switzerland, Bru¨gger et al. (2009) study
how unemployment is affected by differences in culturally determined attitudes towards
work within a narrowly defined geographic area. Their findings indicate that differences
in culture explain differences in unemployment duration in the order of 20 percent.
Algan and Cahuc (2005) and Alesina and Giuliano (2010) also investigate the role of
“family culture” on labor market outcomes. These studies find that strong family ties
reduce labor force participation. Ichino and Maggi (2000) study cultural differences in
the propensity to shirk (absenteeism and misconduct) using data from a large Italian
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bank. They also find strong effects.9 Other empirical studies have looked at the role
of culture in explaining how social norms affect unemployment outcomes. Stutzer and
Lalive (2004) use a novel measure of the social norm to work: The percentage of citizens
in a community who voted in favor of a reduction of unemployment benefits in a Swiss
referendum. They find that a one standard deviation increase in the strength of the
social work norm on average translates into a reduction of unemployment duration
by approximately eleven days. Using British data, Clark (2003) finds similar results:
The well-being of the unemployed is shown to be strongly positively correlated with
reference group unemployment (at the regional, partner, or household level).
2 The model
There is a continuum of workers who belong either to the majority group (M) or to
the minority group (m). Apart from an observable trait (for example the place where
they come from, the color of their skin or their accent), majority and minority workers
are totally identical. There is also an unobservable trait that determines their behavior
on the job. In particular, we assume that workers have either a “good” (g) or “bad”
(b) work habit and are referred to as “good” and “bad” workers.
The employer can observe the group to which the worker belongs (majority or
minority) but not the type (“good” or “bad”). Time is discrete and each active worker
is randomly matched with an employer. The employer decides whether or not to hire
this worker. If a worker of type i (i = b, g) is hired, the payoff to the principal is Πi.
The payoff is 0 if the worker is not hired. We assume that Πg > 0 > Πb. Irrespective
of their type, employed workers earn w > 0. Unemployment leads to a payoff which is,
without loss of generality, normalized to zero.
As stated in the Introduction, we study the intergenerational transmission of work-
habit traits using an overlapping generation model. The way in which this trait is
transmitted is through an education and peer-imitation process that depends on par-
ents’ investment in the trait and the social environment where children live. The
transmission of the trait is here modeled as a mechanism that interacts socialization
inside the family (vertical socialization) with socialization outside the family (oblique
socialization) via imitation and learning from peers and role models as in Bisin and
Verdier (2000, 2001).
Children’s preferences are shaped, via education, by their parents. We assume that
teaching good work ethics is costly and that a parent chooses an education effort, τ ,
possibly zero, so that, with a probability equal to the education effort, education will
be successful and the child will have a good work ethic. Otherwise, the child remains
naive, without any working trait, and is matched to a group of peers from which she
9See Guiso et al. (2006) for an overview of this literature and an interesting discussion of how
culture affects outcomes.
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learns and adopts the good trait with probability f(q; r). Following Saez Marti (2011)
we assume that
f(q; r) =
rqα
rqα + (1− q)α , α > 0, r > 0. (1)
where q is the proportion of agents in the peer group with good habits, α captures
the degree of conformism and r reflects the children’s own valuation of the traits. It is
easily verified that
∂f(q; r)
∂q
> 0 ,
∂f(q; r)
∂r
> 0 (2)
which means that the higher is q, the fraction of individuals with good traits in the
peer group or r, the children’s own valuation of the trait, the higher is f(q; r). In order
to see the role of r, assume that either α = 0, so that popularity is irrelevant or q = 1/2
so that both traits are equally popular. In these two cases, f(q; r) takes value r/(1+r)
and the child would adapt the good trait with a probability which is increasing in r
and equal to 1/2 when r = 1, i.e. when the child finds both traits equally attractive
and the population distribution of traits has no influence. More generally, if r > 1
(r < 1) children have an “innate” preference for good (bad) working habits. Note that
f(q; r) has three fixed points: 0, q(r) and 1, where
q(r) =
r
1
1−α
1 + r
1
1−α
is the unique interior q that solves f(q; r) = q. It is easy to see that q(r) is decreasing
in r and q(1) = 1/2.
Since we are interested in conformism, we will hereafter assume that α ≥ 1. Note
that Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) is a special case when r = α = 1 so that f(q; r) = q.
Figure 1 displays f(q; r) for α > 2 (conformism) and three different values of r: 1/2
(dotted line), 1 (solid) and 2 (dashed). We have also plotted the 45 degree line, which
determines the fixed points. Note that, irrespective of r, 0 and 1 are always fixed
points. There is also an interior fixed point q(r) with q(2) < q(1) = 1/2 < q(1/2).
Let p denote the probability that a child acquires the good trait. We have:
p = τ + (1− τ)f(q; r) (3)
Indeed, the child will have a good work habit if her parents’ transmission is successful
(with probability τ) or if it is unsuccessful (with probability 1− τ) but learns the good
habits from her peers (with probability f(q; r)).
Let C : [0, 1]→ R be the cost function when parents choose effort τ , with C(0) = 0,
C ′(0) = 0, C ′(τ) > 0 for all τ > 0, and C ′′(τ) ≥ 0. We assume that all parents,
irrespective of their type and group, face the same costs. This assumption can easily
be relaxed without affecting the main qualitative results of the paper. In this model,
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Figure 1: Rest points of f(q; r) for α = 2 and r = 1/2, 1, 2
the only reason why different parents may be exerting different efforts will be because
either they have different expectations concerning their children’s future employment
prospects and/or their children have different peer groups. Parent choose effort τ ∈
(0, 1] that maximizes
pV g + (1− p)V b − C(τ) (4)
where V i is the value a parent attaches to her child being of type i (i = b, g) and p is
given by (3). We obtain the following first-order condition:
C ′(τ) =
dp
dτ
V g − dp
dτ
V b. (5)
By substituting (3) in (5), we easily obtain the optimal education effort:
C ′(τ ∗) = (1− f(q; r))U
where
U ≡ V g − V b ≥ 0 (6)
This implies that:
τ ∗ = τ((1− f(q; r)U) = C ′−1((1− f(q; r)U). (7)
Note that the assumptions on C guarantee that τ(0) = 0 and τ ′ > 0. In order to avoid
corner solutions we assume that C ′(1) is large enough (relative to the maximum value
U can take). Parents will exert no effort either when having the good trait does not
give any advantage (i.e., U = 0) or when everybody in the neighborhood has trait g
(i.e., q = 1). Parents’ decision depends on society since parents have less incentive to
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socialize their children the easier it is for them to learn the good trait from society,
namely the larger is f(q; r). Note also that there is cultural substitutability since the
lower is q, the fraction of individuals with good traits in the peer group, or r, the innate
preference for good trait, the higher effort parents will put in transmitting the good
trait.
2.1 Dynamics
We assume a Poisson birth and death process that keeps the population size of active
workers constant: with probability λ an active worker will be active in the next period,
with probability 1−λ and active worker has a child who becomes active the period after.
The proportion of good workers in the next period is equal to the proportion of good
workers who survived from the current period (λq) plus all new-born good children, i.e.
the children born with good parents who adopt good work habits ((1− λ)q p) plus the
children of bad parents who adopt good work habits ((1− λ) (1− q) p), that is
λq + (1− λ)q p+ (1− λ) (1− q) p.
Note that we have assumed that the probability of adopting a good work habit is
independent of the parents’ types since all parents value the “good” trait equally. This
is an important difference with Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). Substituting (3) and
(7) and substracting q we get a difference equation, ∆q(q, U, r) describing the change
in q:
∆q(q, U, r) = (1− λ)(f(q; r)− q) + (1− λ)τ((1− f(q; r))U)(1− f(q; r)). (8)
Let R(U, r) denote the set of rest points of (8), i.e., the q’s which solve ∆q(q, U, r) = 0.
It is easy to see that 1 is always a rest point, i.e. ∆q(1, U, r) = 0 for all U . Moreover
for low enough U , (8) has tree rest points, two of them interior when U > 0. In fact
τ((1− f(q; r))U)(1− f(q; r)) = q − f(q; r), (9)
has three solutions. In order to see this observe that the left hand side is positive and
monotonically decreasing in q (for U > 0) while the right hand side is positive and has
an inverse U-shape in [0, q(r)]. This guarantees that for low enough U , there are three
solutions, qs and qu ( qs ≤ qu) and 1. Moreover, qs is increasing while qu is decreasing
in U . We state the main results in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1. Assume that U ≥ 0. For each r > 0, there exists an X(r) > 0
such that
(i) for all U > X(r),
R(U, r) = {1},
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(ii) for all U ∈ [0, X(r)],
R(U, r) = {qs(U ; r), qu(U ; r), 1}
qs(0; r) = 0, qu(0; r) = q(r), qs1(U ; r) > 0, q
u
1 (U ; r) < 0.
X(r) is such that qs(X(r); r) = qu(X(r); r). The rest points 1 and qs(U ; r) are stable,
qu(U ; r) is unstable.
Proposition 1 shows that for small enough U there two stable equilibria 1 and
qs(U ; r), the latter disappears for large enough U . Observe that qs(U ; r) is increasing
in U. This explains the main mechanism of the model since the results are driven by
parents’ valuations of the future prospects of their children. If they expect that these
are bad (i.e. U small, i.e, having a good trait does pay little), they will exert little
effort and qs(U ; r) is low. If they expect very large benefits of having a good trait, then
qs(U ; r) is larger and could eventually cease to exist. In that case the only rest point
is 1.
The following figures illustrate these results. Figure 2 shows how the rest points
of (8) change with U for a given r. For all parameters in the gray (white) area,
∆q(q, ., r) < 0 (∆q(q, ., r) > 0). In this figure, the solid thick line corresponds to the
stable rest point q = 1, the solid thick curve to the stable rest point qs(U ; r) and the
dotted thick curve to the unstable rest point qu(U ; r). For small enough values of U
(i.e. U < X(r), there are three rest points, two stable (1 and qs(U ; r)) and one unstable
(qu(U ; r)). The rest points qs(U ; r) and qu(U ; r) cease to exist when U > X(r).
XHrL
U
1
qHrL
RHU;rL
Figure 2: Steady states
Figure 3 shows how the rest points change with r, in the figure r < r′. It is easy to
see that increasing the children’s relative value of the good trait (r), given U , increases
the proportion of good workers in the stable rest point, q = qs(U ; r), and reduces X(r),
11
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Figure 3: Steady states
which, in turn, implies that a unique stable equilibrium for which q = 1 is more likely
to emerge.
This figure makes it clear that there are two obvious policies that can reduce the
prevalence of the bad trait: changing children attitudes, r, and changing parent’s
evaluations, U . We next endogenize U . In order to do so we need to analyze the
employers’ hiring behavior.
2.2 Endogenous evaluations
Assume that each time an employer meets a bad worker, she knows her type with
probability α. With probability 1 − α, she (incorrectly) believes that the worker is
good.10 A good worker is never mistaken for a bad one. Our results are robust to the
case of a more general screening technology, which allows for the mistaken classification
of good workers as long as the probability of making a mistake about bad workers is
larger than the probability of making a mistake about good ones. We assume that
employers know the actual proportion q of good agents.
When the worker and the employer are matched, the employer chooses one of the
two following strategies: (i) screening (s) the workers and hire only seemingly good
workers, i.e. all good workers and some bad ones who have been (mistakenly) taken for
good ones and (ii) hire nobody (n).11
Employers prefer strategy s to strategy n when
10The probability α could be group dependent and written as αk, for k = m,M . This extension
would not change any of our results but will unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
11As in a previous version of the paper, we could have assumed, as in Hauk and Saez Marti (2002),
that there were two tasks instead of two types of employment statuses. Task 1 is a more complicated
and better-paid task while task 2 is a low-paid task. In that case, in the screening policy, the employer
12
qΠg + (1− q)(1− α)Πb ≥ 0.
We can rewrite this inequality as follows:12
q ≥ −(1− α)Πb
Πg − (1− α)Πb ≡ q˜ (10)
where q˜ ∈ (0, 1). If the proportion of good workers is sufficiently high (q > q˜), then the
screening strategy s is optimal. We denote the optimal strategy by µ :
µ(q) =
{
s if q ≥ q˜
n if q < q˜
(11)
and define the following index function:
I(q) =
{
1 if µ(q) = s
0 if µ(q) = n.
(12)
In order to compute the child’s well-being, a parent needs to form expectations
concerning the child’s future job opportunities. We assume that parents prefer their
children to have preferences leading to decisions with a higher expected income. Let
the vector pi = {piz}∞z=1 denote the expectations a parent has concerning his child
future employment opportunities, where piz denotes the probability that the child being
educated today is matched z periods later with a screening employer (with probability
(1−piz) the child is expected to meet an employer who will not hire). Let w > 0 be the
wage when hired, λ the probability that an active worker in a given period will still be
active in the next period and V i(pi) the expected earnings of a worker of type i when
the parents’ expectation is pi. It is easy to see that
U(pi) = V g(pi)− V b(pi) = αw
∞∑
z=1
pizλ
z−1 ≥ 0. (13)
When unemployed, good and bad workers have zero income and when screened good
workers are always employed and bad workers are employed with probability (1 − α).
The difference between these payoffs leads to (13); the inequality will be strict whenever
pis > 0 for some s.
In order to study the effect of discrimination we assume that a proportion θp of
employers are profit maximizing and act according to µ(q) (see 11) and a proportion
θd (θd = 1− θp) discriminate some workers (from the minority) and do not hire them
even if this would maximize their profits.
will offer task 1 to seemingly good workers while in the pooling strategy, she will offer task 2 to
everyone. The results will obviously be the same.
12Remember that Πb < 0.
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The long run equilibrium will now depend on the initial condition and on parents’
expectations which depends on firms’ behavior. We focus on stationary states under
rational expectations:
DEFINITION 1. Assume that qt = q
∗ and that the proportion of profit maximizing
employers is θp. The state q∗ is a stable steady state under rational expectations and
profit maximizing behavior if
(i) All non-discriminating employers choose µ(q∗) for all t′ ≥ t while all other firms
always choose the strategy n, i.e. hire no minority workers.
(ii)
piz = θ
pI(q∗), z = 1, 2, 3.. (14)
where I(q∗) is given by (12), and
(ii) q∗ is a stable rest point of ∆q(q, U(pi), r) where pi is given by (14) and U(pi) by
(13).
Let SSE(θp) be the set of stable rest points under rational expectations when the
proportion of profit-maximizing employers is θp. We can now state the following propo-
sition:
PROPOSITION 2. Let θp = {θp, θp, θp...}. Then,
SSE(θp) = {0, qs(U(θp); r), 1} (15)
whenever
U(θp) = θp
αw
(1− λ) < X(r)
and qs(U(θp); r) > q˜. Otherwise,
SSE(θp) = {0, 1}. (16)
Figure 4 shows how the set of steady states changes with θp. As in the previous
figures, the steady-state equilibria are depicted by the thick solid curves. When θp = θ˜p,
qs(U(θ˜
p
); r) = q˜. If the proportion of profit maximizing employers is low (i.e. θp < θ˜p),
the interior steady-state equilibrium with both types of agents (good and bad) does not
exist. The same is true for large enough θp’s provided that U(1) > X(r) (case depicted
in Figure 4). If the proportion of discriminating employer is too high, minority parents
rationally expect that their children will be unemployed and thus do not put any effort
in transmitting the good trait.
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Figure 5 illustrate how initial conditions affect the steady state equilibrium which
is actually reached. In this figure, we have taken a θp such that qs(U(θp); r) > q˜
(i.e. θp > θ˜p) so that SSE(θp) = {0, qs(U(θp); r), 1}. The solid curve corresponds to
(q − f(q; r)). i.e ∆q(q, 0, r). The dashed curve corresponds to ∆q(q, U(θp), r). When
qs > q˜ and qt > q˜, it is rational to expect θ
p and the dynamics follow the dotted
thick curve. Depending on the actual value of qt, the economy converges either to 1
(when qt > q
u) or to qs (when qt ∈ [q˜, qu)). If qt < q˜, it is then profit maximizing to
use the pooling assignment and the relevant dynamics are those depicted by the thick
solid curve. In that case, the economy converges to 0 since there are no incentives for
parents to put effort. Note that, along the convergence path, the non-discriminatory
employers are always maximizing their profits.
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The following proposition states these claims formally:
PROPOSITION 3. Let θp = {θp, θp, θp...} and assume that U(θp) < X(r). There
exist (stationary) rational expectations such that
(i) limt→∞ qt = 0 if q0 < q˜
(ii) limt→∞ qt = qs(U(θp); r) if q0 ∈ [q˜, qu], and
(iii) limt→∞ qt = 1 if q0 > qu(U(θp); r)
whenever qs(U(θp); r) > q˜, otherwise
(i) limt→∞ qt = 0 if q0 < qu(U(θp); r)
(ii) limt→∞ qt = 1 if q0 > qu(U(θp); r)
Note that Proposition 3 describes also the dynamics of the majority. In this case,
since workers belonging to this group are not discriminated, θp = 1. The only differences
between majority and minority workers are given by the location of the interior rest
points, i.e. qs(U(1); r) > qs(U(θp); r) and qu(U(1); r) < qu(U(θp); r), and on the ini-
tial conditions. To summarize, since qs(U(θp); r) is increasing in U while qu(U(θp); r)
is decreasing in U , the long run distribution of traits depends not only on the ini-
tial conditions (composition of the peer group) but also on parents’ expectations and
employers prejudices. This could explain why some groups may end up having lower
working ethics. Small differences in r and or in U may end up having large long run
effects.
In the next sections, we study the effect of policies that can break down this vicious
cycle of negative attitudes and behavior that lead to unemployment and bad working
habits among minority workers. As stated above, it should be clear that policies can
reduce unemployment and the prevalence of the bad trait in the minority population
by changing children attitudes, r, and parents evaluations, U .
3 Affirmative Action
Let us start by considering an Affirmative-Action policy that consists of giving a pref-
erential treatment to discriminated groups, for example by imposing minimum hiring
quotas to firms.13
Let us focus on minority workers and assume first that q is such that the non-
discriminatory employers are not willing to hire any minority worker (and neither are
the discriminatory ones). In that case U = 0, parents exert no effort and the long-run
13For an overview and evaluation on Affirmative Action policies in the United States, see Holzer
and Neumark (2000, 2006).
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equilibrium is q∗ = 0. Assume now that all employers are forced to hire a proportion
φ of minority workers (Affirmative Action policy I ). This policy will have an effect on
the proportion of good workers only if it changes the parents’ evaluation of the traits.
Since employment possibilities are independent of type, i.e., both types get the same
expected wage, the parents’s valuation, U , is zero and the Affirmative Action policy
has no effect on the equilibrium.
Consider now an Affirmative Action policy that requires the screening assign-
ment for a quota φ of workers (Affirmative Action policy II ).14 Observe that Affir-
mative Action policy II is just a general case of an anti-discrimination law where
anti-discrimination requires equal treatment of everyone and the affirmative action we
consider here requires equal treatment of a fraction of workers. If parents expect this
policy to be implemented, they will exert a positive effort since the evaluation of the
trait is now:
U(φ) = φ
αw
(1− λ) > 0
where φ = {φ, φ, ..}. This policy has the potential of being effective since good workers
have a higher probability of being employed.
Assume now that the first policy is introduced when all non-discriminatory employ-
ers are already hiring some minority workers (those who seem to be good) and parents
evaluation is given by U(θp)). The introduction of Affirmative Action policy I changes
the evaluation of the parents to U(φθp)), with
U(φθp) < U(θp),
where φθp = {φθp, φθp, ..}. This policy has clearly a negative long-run effect since it
reduces the equilibrium value of good workers (qs is increasing in U). The second policy
(Affirmative Action policy II) will, instead, have a positive effect because it increases
the value of a good child, above the one without intervention, i.e.,
U(θp + φθd) > U(θp).
where θd = 1 − θp and θp + φθd = {θp + φθd, θp + φθd, ..}. Without any Affirmative
Action policy, all non-prejudiced employers will employ seemingly good workers, which
gives an advantage to the good workers (since bad workers are detected with positive
probability). Under the first Affirmative Action policy, the advantage of being “good” is
smaller and, as a result, parents put less effort in transmitting the good work habit trait.
This leads to a lower equilibrium value and could possibly lead to the disappearance
14The main difference between these two Affirmative Action policies is that, in the first one, em-
ployers are obliged to hire φ% of their workers from the minority group but cannot test them. So
whether the worker is “good” or “bad” is irrelevant in the employment process and “good” and “bad”
workers have the same chance of being hired. In the second Affirmative Action policy, employers are
still obliged to hire φ% of their workers from the minority group but can test them. As a result, only
“good” workers and seemingly “good” workers with bad work habits will be hired.
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of the interior equilibrium qs(U(φθp) if the economy is sufficiently close to q˜. Instead,
when the second Affirmative Action policy is implemented, a larger share of workers
are automatically screened and the return is higher for good workers leading to an
increase in the proportion of workers with good habits. We can now summarize these
findings in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4. Affirmative Action policy II always increases the equilibrium
proportion of good workers. Affirmative action I has a negative effect if introduced
when the equilibrium proportion of good workers is positive, otherwise it has no effect
on the proportion of good workers. This policy always reduces employers’ profits.
Our results concerning Affirmative Action I are similar to that of Coate and Loury
(1993). In their paper, Affirmative Action is modeled as a government-mandated con-
straint on employers, requiring them to assign workers from each group to more re-
warding jobs at the same rate. They show that Affirmative action may sometimes
fail because, to comply with the Affirmative-Action policy, employers must lower their
standard for assigning the workers that they have negative views about to good jobs.
This is referred to as a patronizing equilibrium. Lowering the standard may reduce
investment incentives because the favored workers see themselves as likely to succeed
without acquiring the relevant skills. Thus, employers’ negative stereotypes can con-
tinue to be confirmed in equilibrium under Affirmative Action. Coate and Loury show
that this equilibrium is more likely to exist if the proportion of these workers is rela-
tively rare in the population. Even if the mechanism is different, this result is close to
ours when the first Affirmative Action policy is implemented. In our case, compared
to the equilibrium without Affirmative Action, parents put relatively less effort into
transmitting the good trait because a fraction of workers, irrespective of their type, are
employed with certainty.
Observe, however, that, compared to Coate and Loury (1993), we are able to give
the exact condition under which such a patronizing equilibrium exists. In our model,
without any policy intervention, if U(θp) < X(r) and qs(U(θp); r) > q˜ (or equivalently
θp < θ˜p), there are three stable steady-state equilibria: 0, 1 and qs(U(θp); r) (see
Proposition 3). In this section, we have shown that the Affirmation Action policy I
always decreases the proportion of good workers by changing in an unfavorable way
parents’ expectation and thus by decreasing parents’ effort. This means, in particular,
that qs(U(θp); r) > qs(U(φθp); r). We can give the new conditions under which the
intermediate patronizing equilibrium exists: U(φθp); r) < X(r) and qs(U(φθp); r) > q˜.
Observe also that, contrary to Coate and Loury (1993), we are able to analyze
another Affirmative Action policy (or anti-discrimination law) that imposes a quota
for minority workers to be treated like majority workers. We obtain exactly the opposite
results than Coate and Loury and our first Affirmative Action policy in the sense that
a patronizing equilibrium does not exist. In Proposition 4, we show this Affirmative
Action policy always increases the proportion of good workers in equilibrium because
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this policy changes parents’ expectations so that they increase their effort to transmit
the good trait to their children. This, in turn, leads to a higher proportion of individuals
with good work habits in the minority group. As a result, because of this policy,
minority workers are more likely to have good work habits and employers are more likely
to maximize their profits and change their negative beliefs about minority workers.
Note that, even if we start at q0 = 0, i.e. all minority workers have bad work habits,
introducing this Affirmative Action policy (or anti-discrimination law) will lead to an
equilibrium for which q > 0. If the quota φ is large enough, we may even end up with
an equilibrium q for which q > q˜ so that firms do not make losses and maximize their
profit. Here also we can give the conditions under which the intermediate equilibrium
exists: U(θp + φθd) < X(r) and qs(U(θp + φθd); r) > q˜. This implies that the first
Affirmative Action policy has to be implemented forever to help minority workers
since employers keep their negative beliefs while the second one can be efficient even if
implemented temporarily since it may change minority workers’ working habits.
4 Integration
Racial integration is a very sensitive and highly debated policy in the United States.15
For example, the Moving to Opportunity” (MTO) program, which aim is to move very
poor households to richer areas, can be considered as an integration policy.16 Our
model can shed some light on this controversial debate. Assume now that children
from one group are also influenced by peers from the other group, and let σm ∈ [0, 1/2]
(σM ∈ [0, 1/2]) be the parameter capturing the extent of integration of the minority
(majority) group, so that if σi = 0 children of group i have no contact with those of
the other group, while if σi = 1/2 both groups of peers are equally important for the
i-children. We can now write the oblique transmission function of group i as
fi(q; r) = f(σiq
j + (1− σi)qi; r), for i, j = m,M (17)
where q = (qm, qM).
15For instance, in 1974, federal judge W. Arthur Garrity ordered that Boston’s schools be integrated
through forced busing (black children were driven by bus to white schools). Twenty-five years later,
in June 1999, facing pressure from a lawsuit by white parents and advocates of neighborhood schools,
the city’s school board voted 5-2 to stop the busing policy and adopt a race-blind admissions policy
starting in September 2000 (Education Week, 08/04/99 edition, by Caroline Hendrie).
16By giving housing assistance (i.e. vouchers and certificates) to low-income families, the MTO
programs help them relocate to better and richer neighborhoods. The results of most MTO programs
(in particular for Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York) show a clear improvement
of the well-being of participants and better labor market outcomes (see, in particular, Ladd and
Ludwig, 2001, Katz et al., 2001, Kling et al., 2005, Rosenbaum and Harris, 2001). Observe that the
MTO programs do not specifically target minority families (such as blacks) but poor families. But
since the two are correlated, this is a good example of an integration policy.
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The dynamics of qn and qm are jointly determined and can be written as
∆qm(q, U
m) = (1−λ)(fm(q; r)−qm+τ(Um, σmqM +(1−σm)qM ; r))(1−fm(q; r) (18)
and
∆qM (q, U
M) = (1−λ)(fM(q; r)−qM+τ(UM , σMqm+(1−σM)qm; r))(1−fM(q; r) (19)
Assume that integration occurs when qm = 0 (Um = 0) and qM = 1 (UM > 0). It
is easy to see that (0, 1) is not a rest point of (18)-(19) since at q = (0, 1)
∆qm((0, 1), U
m) = (1− λ)(f(σm; r) > 0 (20)
and
∆qM ((0, 1), U
M) = (1− λ)(f(1− σM ; r)− 1)(1− τ(UM , 1− σM ; r)) < 0 (21)
and integration has an immediate positive effect on the minority workers and a negative
effect on the majority. If integration occurs when qm = 0 (U
m = 0) and qM = q
s(UM ; r)
(UM > 0), its immediate effect is again positive for the minority group since
∆qm((0, q
s(Um; r)), Um) = (1− λ)(f(σmqs(UM ; r); r) > 0. (22)
The effect on the majority group is ambiguous. We cannot sign ∆qM ((0, q
s(UM ; r)), Um)
without knowing to what extent parents’ efforts compensate the effect of a worse peer
group.
The following figure show the dynamics in the space (qm, qM). We have assumed
that if qi ≥ q˜ parents expect the separating assignment and, below that value, they
expect the pooling assignment. We also assume that, because of discrimination, under
the separating policy, the minority workers are worse off than the majority ones and
therefore qsM > q
s
m > 0 and that r = 1 so that children view both traits as similar. The
left hand side panel corresponds to σm = σM = 0. In that case, depending only on
its initial value, qi converges to 0, q
s
i or 1, its dynamics being independent of qj. On
the left hand panel, we make σm = σM > 0. It is easy to see that integration maybe
beneficial for both groups in the long run but not in the short term.
This could explain why the different integration policies implemented in the US and
in Europe17 seem to have failed. Indeed, mixing policies, which include school busing,
forced integration of public housing, and laws barring discrimination in housing and
17For instance, the creations of Zones of Educational Priority (ZEP) and the rehabilitation of bleak
housing projects in immigrant neighborhoods under the guise of urban policy (‘politique de la ville’)
in France had very limited effects. See, for example, Benabou et al. (2009) for an evaluation of the
ZEP and Brubaker (2001) who compares the different ways of assimilating ethnic minorities in France,
Germany and the US.
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Figure 6: Integration. α = 2, r = 1
employment,18 have often had limited effects and are often opposed by the majority
groups (see e.g., Jacoby, 1998, and Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 2002).
Interestingly, Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008), who incorporate neighborhood effects
into an otherwise standard statistical discrimination model, find a similar result, even
though the mechanism is totally different. In their paper, increasing integration tends
to lower the costs of human acquisition for B-workers while raising these costs for A-
workers. Thus, if integration proceeds sufficiently far, the authors show that negative
stereotypes cannot be sustained.
Guryan (2004) shows that the desegregation plans that have been implemented in
American schools in the last forty years have mainly benefited the black students by
reducing their high school drop out rates while they had no effect on the dropout rates
of the other students. Peer effects are shown to be one of the main explanations for
this result. Studying the Metco program, a long-running desegregation program that
mostly sends Black students out of the Boston public school district to attend schools
in more aﬄuent suburban districts, Angrist and Lang (2004) find similar results.19
18See Lang (2007) for an overview of these policies in the U.S.
19There is also a growing literature in the fields of public finance, development and urban economics
that shows that investments in public goods, tastes for redistribution, and other forms of civic behavior
are less common in racially or ethnically diverse communities (see, in particular, Alesina et al., 1999,
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, Luttmer, 2001, Vigdor, 2004).
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5 Concluding remarks
We have introduced a dynamic model of cultural transmission to explain different
outcomes for minority and majority workers. We have shown that if the proportion
of taste-based prejudiced employers is sufficiently high, prejudices can be confirmed in
equilibrium. Otherwise, multiple equilibria exist, with and without discrimination. We
have also studied different policies aiming at reducing discrimination. Both Affirmative
Action20 and integration policies may work. The mechanisms through which these two
policies affect the quality of the workers are different, though. Affirmative action
policies directly affect the expected payoff of the different types of workers and the
parents’ incentives to invest in those traits. By “improving” the quality of the peers
with whom minority children interact, integration policy has a positive effect on those
workers with a worse peer group. The opposite happens for the other children since,
after integration, they interact with a “worse” quality peer group. From a political
economy perspective, it is likely that all workers will support the Affirmative Action
policy while only families from bad neighborhoods may favor the integration policy. As
far as employers are concerned, it seems plausible that they may object to Affirmative
Action policies that impose too small quotas. The reason for this opposition is that
they are forced to offer contracts that are suboptimal given the average composition
of workers. When the Affirmative Action quotas are sufficiently high, both employers
and workers benefit from the policy.
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